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This final work project forecasts Farfetch’s results, analyzing its business and position in the luxury market. 
The COVID-19 pandemic brought good things for the company, experiencing a high in new active 
consumers. This allied with the new focus on brand development brings great prospects for the revenues’ 
growth. Following our assumptions and calculations, we forecast a price target of US$70,33 for FY21, 
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This report is part of the “Equity Research: Valuation of Farfetch” report (annexed) and should be read 
has an integral part of it. 
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Farfetch was founded in 2007 by José Neves in a small office in London. Born from the dream of 
creating an e-commerce marketplace for luxury retailers and fashion enthusiasts around the 
world, the company focused on small retailers that wanted to expand their exposure and client 
base.  
In 2015 Farfetch become a unicorn (start-ups that are valued at US$1 billion) – raising US$86 
million at a valuation of US$1 billion joining the likes of Facebook, Airbnb, Zomato and Uber. After 
several seed investments, in September 2018 Farfetch launched its IPO, at a value of over 
US$5,8 million selling its shares at US$20 each. A few minutes later the stock was already at 
around US$28.  
However, the company has never had positive results but has seen jumps in revenues every year 
and keeps focused on technological investments to stand out from its competitors expecting to 
see big returns from these investments. 
In 2017 Farfetch launched the Farfetch Store of the Future concept, which aimed to reinvent the 
consumer experience in luxury retail, teaming the physical experience with the digital advantages 
of online shopping, capturing consumer data and preferences which will improve the experience 
with the sales associates. Farfetch’s Store of the Future pilot is being used at a CHANEL boutique 
in Paris, which shows the confidence that brands have in Farfetch’s innovative culture. 
Today, Farfetch serves as platform for over 500 luxury brands, 700 luxury retailers, 2,5 million 
customers and acquired and partnered with several businesses, such as JD.com, Browns, 
Stadium Goods and the New Guards Group, among others. 
Business Model and Segments 
Farfetch is an online luxury retailer that works with several luxury brands, retailers, wholesalers 
and boutiques. Its main busines unit is the Digital Platfrom – this is how Farfetch was first 
imagined and conceptualized. This business unit represents the online marketplace, the 
company’s core business and comprises StadiumGoods.com, Farfetch Store of the Future, 
Farfetch Platform Solutions (white-label technology developer for luxury sellers), 
BrownsFashion.com and Farfetch’s website, currently being the biggest driver of the company’s 
revenues. 
The business model within this unit revolves around two different types of sale: first-party and 
third-party. The former consists of sales on Farfetch’s platform of inventory that was purchased 
by the company. In this type of sales, Farfetch recognizes as revenues the whole price that the 
client pays – this means that the revenues will be equal to the Gross Merchandise Value (GMV). 
On the other hand, third-party sales derive from sales made on inventories held by partner 
boutiques or retailers. Here the company takes a predetermined Take-Rate, a commission on 
these types of sales. In this case the revenues will be a certain percentage of the full GMV. This 
business segment has been the biggest source of revenue for Farfetch and the company’s 
valuation depends highly on it, ultimately leading the share price upwards or downwards, 
depending on its success. 
The company also provides fulfilment solutions, from shipping to customs clearing, enabling its 
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partners to ship to 190 countries and giving them access to a “fully integrated logistics network”, 
to grow the Digital Platform. Farfetch does not record profit from these services, breaking even 
on their costs.  
Farfetch invested in 2019 in a new business unit that is expected to become one of the major 
drivers for its growth. It acquired the New Guards Group, and the business unit of Brand Platform 
was born. This segment focuses on B2B activities including “design, production, brand 
development and sales” of brands owned by New Guards to wholesalers, as per Farfetch’s annual 
report. It works as an “incubator” of brands - New Guards owns brands like Off-White and Palm 
Angels which have proven very popular and successful, if this is maintained and improved by 
Farfetch it could lead to very positive results. 
The acquisition took place in August 2019 and in December 2019 Brand Platform revenues 
represented 16% of Farfetch’s total revenues for that year. This highlights the impact that this 
new segment might have in the future of the company’s future revenues, being an important 
variable when valuating Farfetch. 
These revenues include New Guards’ revenues excluding the ones from directly operated stores 
(included in the in-store business unit) and from New Guards’ owned e-commerce websites or 
from Farfetch’s marketplace (which are included in the Digital Platform segment). 
The third business unit is the In-Store, which includes all revenues made from retail stores 
operated by Browns, Stadium Goods and New Guards (all acquired by Farfetch) not including the 
franchised stores. This is the business unit with smaller contribution to Farfetch’s revenues, 
something that became even more emphasized with the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdowns 
necessary to contain it. We do not anticipate this segment to have a major impact on the 
company’s valuation since its revenues have not been and are not expected to become significant 
in the future, not greatly affecting the valuation. The revenues on the two latter segments are not 
commission based, as they are both first party based. 
It is fair to say that the pandemic had a positive impact in the two business units firstly mentioned 
which depend more on the online environment and on the development of brands while strongly 
damaging the in-store segment, which needs to have people through the doors to capture 
revenues. 
Trends 
Farfetch has only seen negative results in the past, in 2017 it had losses after taxes of 
US$112.275 and in 2019 these losses increased to US$373.688. Despite these results 
there is some light at the end of the tunnel: revenues have seen massive growth, growing 
by more than 50% on both years and the largest and growing expenses are mainly general 
and administrative ones, linked to the acquisition of New Guards. Because of this we 
expected that these expenses will be offset by the revenues in the future and that with time, 
the group becomes more cost efficient, arriving at better results at the end of the year. 
The main driver for Farfetch’s growth has been the Digital Platform segment, representing over 
80% of the company’s total revenue in 2017, 2018 and 2019 and growing 65% and 43% in the 
last two years. This growth is mainly due to the increase in active consumers (clients who have 
purchased in the last 12 months), that have grown by almost 50% in both 2018 and 2019, 
increasing by 686 thousand active consumers only in 2019. Another factor for this jump in 
revenues in this segment was the increase of 75% of First-Party GMV, which translates 100% to 
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Figure 1: Earnings per Share evolution (in US$). 
Source: Company data 
the Digital Platform sales, instead of accounting for commissions like Third-Party GMV. These 
increases were partially counteracted by small decreases in the Average Order Value on 
Farfetch’s Marketplace.  
We expect these trends to continue going forward: The Digital Platform segment will continue 
being the major source of revenues, but its percentage of revenues will decrease due to the 
strong appearance of the Brand Platform segment; active consumers will ride the e-commerce 
explosion wave and continue increasing throughout all regions and First-Party sales will increase 
as Farfetch begins selling more of their own brands instead of third-party products. 
 
With the COVID-19 pandemic, small boutiques and retailers faced tough challenges and many 
grasped for survival. The ones partnered with Farfetch saw these challenges being eased due to 
the presence of this online player and many new partnerships with small physical stores were 
made. This pandemic was an unexpected blessing to Farfetch, as boutiques built trust in the 
platform and realized the importance of the marketplace they were inserted into. This meant that 
Farfetch gained importance and negotiating power to possibly increase the Third-Party Take-
Rate in the future and find new interested stores, which can be very important for this segment 
going forward. 
The In-Store segment, which was represented by 5 stores in 2019 in the USA and in Europe, has 
never had, and we do not expect it to have, significant materiality in Farfetch’s result: in all three 
past years this business unit did not account for more than 5% of the company’s revenues. 
Despite this, it is still relevant to note that Browns, Stadium Goods and New Guards’ directly 
operated stores showed good results in 2019, increasing Farfetch’s in-store revenues by over 
70%. 
The Brand Platform segment, as previously stated, was only introduced in August 2019 which 
does not give us a possibility to analyse past information but allowing us to check for future 
potential. In 5 months, New Guards’ brands accounted for 16% of Farfetch’s revenues in 2019. 
This segment expands Farfetch’s offer of brands and allows it to capture new up-coming trends 
that can prove very successful, absorbing 100% of the GMV which will lead to higher revenues 
and profits. In the first half of 2020 this segment already represents 28,5% of the company’s total 
adjusted revenue (total revenue less fulfilment revenue, which has no economic benefit for 
Farfetch), in the future we expect this percentage to increase. 
The regions of Europe, Middle East and Africa were the biggest sources of Farfetch’s revenues, 
representing 40% of revenues in 2017. However, emerging economies such as China and other 
countries in the Asia Pacific region are ready to turn this around, in 2019 the revenues coming 
from this area increased by 95% and its significance became almost the same as the Europe, 
Middle East and Africa regions, representing 36% contrasting with the 37% of the latter. In the 








2017A 2018A 2019A Q1_2020A Q2_2020A Q3_2020A
Revenue Segmentation
Digital Platform Brand Platform In-Store
Figure 2: Revenue segmentation (in 
thousands of US$). 
Source: Company data 
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In 2019 the large investment in New Guards Group translated into a massive increase in the value 
of intangible assets in the company (from US$103 345 in 2018 to US$1 362 967 in 2019) and 
technology investments, demand generation expenses among others lead to the negative results 
in the past years while creating a strong foundation for the future, in hopes to create a solid luxury 
company, with space and capability to grow further. We expect these investments to be profitable 
in the long run, but despite Neves’s optimistic forecast of Farfetch seeing positive results already 
in 2021, we believe that profitability will take longer to achieve, only in 2022.  
 
Stock Performance 
Since Farfetch’s IPO in 2018 its stock has experienced high fluctuation. The announcement of 
the IPO generated a considerable interest among investor and, starting from a price of US$20 
per share, at the end of the first day it was already trading at US$28, confirming interest and 
expectations of investors regarding Farfetch. The first and most relevant negative fluctuation 
came in August 2019 when the company announced the acquisition of the New Guards group. 
Farfetch stock’s price suffered a massive drop from US$18.25 to US$10,13 (-44,4%). This was 
attributed to the doubts of investors about the change of the company’s business plan, as they 
expected Farfetch to focus on its marketplace and an asset-light strategy taking advantage of the 
relations established with external boutiques. With this investment, however, that perspective has 
changed, with the company owning several designers, growing vertically, and moving away from 
a pure retailer business model. 
The stock price gradually increased throughout time facing the second big change in the begining 
of November 2020 when it jumped from US$28,13 to US$43,84 in just 9 days, an increase of 
55,8%. This increase was caused by the announcement of a deal made between Farfetch, the 
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Figure 3: Geographic Segmentation of 
Revenues in 2019. 
Source: Company data 
Figure 5: Gross Profit (in thousands of 
US$). 
Source: Company data 




Figure 4: Intangible Assets growth (in 
thousands of US$) 
Source: Company data 
Forecasts 
Revenues driven by active consumers growth 
As seen previously, one of the more important drivers in the Digital Platform business unit are the 
platform’s active consumers. These are the people that not only visit Farfetch’s webpage but also 
shop regularly through it. The increase seen in the past years has been of major importance to 
the company’s evolution and is expected to keep reaching new highs in the future. With COVID-
19 online shopping became more prevalent, people who did not use to shop through the Internet 
were “forced” to embrace this new reality, and those who already did, reinforced this habit. 
Despite sacrificing some of the shopping experience, there was a general movement to the online 
in search of safety in these current times. 
For this reason, we expect Farfetch to experience a big rise in active consumers during the 
pandemic, as these gain trust and become loyal to the company, representing, in 2021, a growth 
of 30% and 35% in the Americas and Europe, Middle East and Africa respectively, as the latter 
as shown far greater historical growths. In the future we expect the active consumers growth to 
gradually converge to 10% in the former region and to 5% in the latter. 
 
The region of Asia Pacific is another dimension and is expected to support most of the market’s 
growth. Furthermore, China (the biggest contributor to the region's market) faced the crisis 
brought by the pandemic before any other country, recovering at a fast pace, and with its luxury 
sales expected to grow in relation to 2019. Because of this and fuelled by the partnership made 
between Alibaba and Farfetch, we expect the number of active consumers to grow at a higher 
pace in this region, by 40% in 2021 and then gradually declining to a growth of 20% in 2025. In 
2025 Farfetch’s Digital platform is expected to record about 7,13 million active consumers in all 
regions, representing a CAGR of 22,90% between 2019 and 2025.  
For this business unit, it was used a bottom-up forecast, as seen above. First-Party share of 
revenues is expected to continue increasing in relation to Third-Party, maximizing the revenue 
collected by Farfetch since this does not depend on a retained commission. This is positive since 
the take-over rate has been decreasing every year, representing smaller revenues in third-party 
sales. The cause of such a decrease can be mainly attributable to the maintenance of competitive 
advantage and attractiveness when brands begin to consider developing their own online 
marketplaces. Keeping the take-rate at around 25%, allied with all Farfetch's experience and 
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Figure 6: Digital platform revenues (in 
US$ millions) and active consumers 
forecast.  
Source: Company data and analysts’ 
forecast 
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Such increases will be shortly offset by decreases in average order values. In turn, there will be 
an increase in the average number of orders by active consumers, as people become more used 
to shop online and do it more often. All these factors combined lead to a steep increase in the 
revenue growth rate for 2020 due to the prevalence of online shopping. These will slow down 
from then on, stabilizing at 24% in the final years of forecast. We expect this business unit’s 
revenues to grow at a CAGR of 35,89% between 2019 and 2025 arriving at a value of US$5,2 
billion in the last year of the forecast. 
  
Brand Platform for the future 
Farfetch’s biggest investment was made to create the Brand Platform business unit with the 
acquisition of New Guards. This brought a whole new way of getting revenues, a whole new 
business model which investors were wary off due to the higher risk that the company was 
incurring in. But by facing higher risks, Farfetch opened itself to the possibility of higher rewards, 
hoping that brands like Off-White and Palm Springs along with the group's’ ability to create brands 
from scratch would prove the profitability of the deal. 
According to Neves, New Guard's revenue growth of close to 60% every year along with its high 
profitability attracted Farfetch’s investment. New Guards differentiates itself from other companies 
by their ability to scout talent, create community driven brands and initiate buzz and hype around 
its brands through social media platforms. Before the acquisition, New Guards was digital 
oriented but did not have the capability to digitally sell their products, focusing on wholesale, 
which was the synergy that Farfetch looked to tackle with the purchase of New Guards. 
Brands brought up by New Guards like Off-White, Palm Angels and Heron Preston are what gives 
the group a good track record at identifying the best brands to be launched according to new 
demanded luxury, leading Farfetch's hopes on the investment. 
The new luxury consumers demand for individuality, especially Gen Z, which is rising as the most 
important costumer group in this market is shifting demand and preferences. Today, streetwear 
is the new luxury demanded by the masses: sneakers, sweaters, hoodies, and others are the first 
to be sold out as soon as each product launches. Brands need to be different, have a defining 
culture and mark their position. Because New Guards focuses on these points and historically 
has proven that they understand the luxury landscape there are high expectations for the success 
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Figure 7: Average order value (US$) and 
Average order per consumer forecast  
Source: Company data and analysts’ 
forecast 
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Due to the lack of past information, the forecasts for this segment were based on a Deloitte’s 
study that projects the growth for the top luxury brands in the world for the upcoming years. It was 
forecasted that sales in the Americas, also due to Amazon’s new entry in the luxury market, grow 
at lower rates than the other regions – 27% in 2021 and 2022 and 19,9% in the following years. 
Europe, Middle East and Africa will be forecasted to grow at 27% in 2021 and 2022 and from then 
on at the same pace as the Americas region (19,9%). Asia Pacific, the region in which China is 
included and that according to Bain & Company is expected to account for 50% of the market in 
2025 is expected to grow even faster, at 44,5% in 2021, 35,90% in 2022 through 2024 and then 
converging to the pace of the other two regions. We expect Brand Platform’s revenues to reach 
US$1,5 billion in 2025, growing at a CAGR of 44,9% between 2019 and 2025. 
Nonetheless it is important to note the risks in this business segment, and not only look at how 
the company will do if the venture is successful. New Guards might not be able to identify and 
promote successful brands in the future, while bad marketing strategies and product positioning 
can lead to a loss of relevance of its brands. Furthermore, New Guard’s biggest revenue source 
is Off-White, to which the Group does not own the trademark, only having an exclusive deal with 
the designer.  
A big risk that Farfetch faces is that the exclusive contract runs out in 2035 with a clause that 
allows Off-White to opt-out of the deal in 2026. This is significant because Off-White designer is 
now Louis Vuitton’s Creative Director and is likely to leave New Guards to join the giant’s 
umbrella, highlighting the importance to keep focusing on the development of new brands, build 
a community, tackle social causes, and create buzz around them. 
In-Store forecasts 
This segment has always been of small importance in Farfetch’s business and we expect this 
trend to continue. COVID-19 and the lockdowns related to the pandemic will strengthen this factor 
- in the first half of 2020 there was a massive drop of in-store sales. This allied with the new trust 







1 266 956 
1 519 081 
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Brand Platform's Revenues
 Americas Europe, Middle East and Asia Asia Pacific






100 098 102 822 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
In-Store Revenues
 Americas Europe, Middle East and Asia Asia Pacific
Figure 8: Brand Platform revenues by 
region forecast (in thousands of $) 
Source: Company data and analysts’ 
forecast 
Figure 9: In-Store revenues per region 
forecast (in thousands of $). 
Source: Company data and analysts’ 
forecast 
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Nevertheless, it is always important to have a physical presence in luxury to enhance the 
consumer experience and relation with the brand. Because of this, Farfetch is in the process of 
opening 5 stores in 2020 in Europe and in the USA, while we expect new openings in the future, 
especially in the Asia Pacific region, capturing the most value from this growing market. 
The forecast for this business unit was done on a top-down basis, considering the market and its 
scenarios and due to the lack of information it was assumed equal revenue per store. The 
revenues per region were then adjusted for small differences in growth rates. In the Americas 
region, it was assumed that they will grow slightly above the market, just like in the region of 
Europe, Middle East and Africa, given the more mature stages that the luxury market is in these 
regions. In the Asia Pacific region, the stores’ revenues are expected to grow at a higher rate 
than the market for the first years of operations as an emerging and full of new luxury costumers 
region. 
These forecasts can have implications due to the COVID-19 crisis. If it lasts much longer and 
more lockdowns are necessary, the growth will further shrink. At the moment, the expectation is 
that a vaccine will be available soon. However, this does not mean that normal retail activity will 
fully recover but evidences good prospects for the future. If there are no further complications 
with the disease, it is possible that at the end of 2021 retail operations are back to how they used 
to be. Finally, this segment would gradually continue to lose materiality in the company’s 
operations, arriving at a relative weight of 1% of Farfetch’s revenues in 2025, with revenues of 
US$102,8 million growing at a CAGR of 24,5% between 2019 and 2025. 
Cost of Revenue & Demand Generation Expenses 
Cost of revenue in Farfetch’s business represents the cost of goods sold (inventory from first-
party sales and from in-store sales), delivery costs associated with the fulfilment of orders and 
cost of revenue associated with New Guards Group operations. These costs have been 
increasing and driving gross margins down, but as a luxury player, we expect Farfetch to become 
more cost efficient and reach the high gross margins normally obtained by its competitors in luxury 
(for example LMVH with a gross margin of 66% and Kering, 55%), allied with the good prospects 
of the Brand platform segment which we expect to incubate several high success brands, 
delivering high gross margins. In 2025 this caption is expected to reach 53%, between all 
business units. 
 
The Digital Platform is responsible for a determinant cost in the business: demand generation 
expenses. These are marketing costs, with the purpose of acquiring and retaining costumers, 
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Figure 10: Cost of revenues and 
operating expenses forecast as 
percentage of sales. 
Source: Company data and analysts’ 
forecast 
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relation to the platform’s sales, but Neves expects these to decrease in relation to sales.  
Still, it is important to not disregard the necessity of these expenses since it is one of the biggest 
forms of consumer acquisition, driving the company’s revenues. As time progresses and clients 
become more loyal and word-of-mouth starts to carry Farfetch around communities, it is natural 
that expenses of this type are less necessary, thus the expected decrease in relation to sales 
forecasted by the CEO.  
Resale luxury as an opportunity 
Since the most primitive type of trade began it was normal to keep exchanging things that people 
did not need anymore. If someone has a baby on the way, they will need to buy baby clothes and 
toys and a crib. Once the baby grows those things become unnecessary for the parents and a 
generally accepted thing to do is to resell those products at a lower cost, as second-handed 
products. People do this with all kinds of stuff, from clothes to cars or to smartphones without any 
problem or dispute from brands. 
Luxury items have the singularity of being expensive, scarce, and exclusive and sometimes only 
a few copies of a product are sold for a limited time which increases the previous attributes. 
People saw the opportunity to resell these types of products, which due to its increased rarity, if 
kept in their original condition would increase their market price due to simple supply and demand 
rules. This brought business opportunities to companies: people needed a platform to do these 
trades and most important of all, a caveat in this market, there was a need to check for the 
authenticity of the products.  
Rising to this challenge appeared several start-ups that specialized in checking for fake products 
and reselling to other consumers, like TheRealReal, Vestiaire Colective, ThredUp and even eBay 
launched eBay Valet (which later was discontinued) that aimed to serve as a platform to resell 
luxury items. The start-ups saw great success, leveraging a fast-growing market that is expected 
to reach US$51 billion in 2024. There are several advantages to this business model, according 
to Vestiaire Colective’s CEO it will allow people that cannot pay for luxury’s full price to still shop 
and participate in the luxury community at a lower starting price. Furthermore, the money that 
people receive from reselling their products will most likely be kept in the luxury market, as they 
save to get their next handbag or jacket. Finally, when people know that they can resell their 
products they will pay a premium for this safety, which means that more people will be attracted 
to buy luxury. 
  
Despite all these advantages that the resale market can bring, and the fact that companies 
operating in this sector can get useful data from luxury consumers (which brands and collections 
are doing good, being more demanded), they still have a complicated relationship with some 
luxury brands. Possible reasons for this are that luxury brands believe that their items should be 
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Figure 11: Luxury Resale Market 
forecasted growth (in thousands of $) 
Source: ThredUp and analysts’ 
computations 
or even that it is not fair that sometimes the resale price is higher than the first price.  
Chanel has been in the center of the fights between luxury resellers and brands, even realigning 
its pricing format in 2015 to fight the reselling market in China, where people would buy products 
in Europe where they were cheaper and sell them in China where they were very expensive. 
Their worries were that people would buy their products in this “grey-market” instead of in their 
stores, while also risking buying counterfeits further damaging the brand’s image. Chanel went 
further as to even filling lawsuits against the reselling start-ups, claiming that these were making 
use of the brand’s reputation for their own financial gain. 
Unlike Chanel, many other brands are looking to these start-ups as opportunities rather than 
threats – consumers who start buying a brand on these platforms for a lower price can fall in love 
with it and start being loyal clients of its products. Thus, many top luxury brands now partner with 
resellers in some shape or form, from sharing data to having active partnerships. 
Neves defends reselling, saying that the fact it exists proves that brands did a good job with 
marketing and designing, debunking one of luxury’s brands points easily: resale products are 
sometimes sold at a mark-up (mostly products that had limited production and will never be 
launched again) because after the first sale there will be even less available for sale, which will 
increase their value because people will still want to own that exclusive item and will be willing to 
pay extra for it. Without platforms for reselling, the pricing of these products would not be 
transparent, nobody would know how much other people would be willing to sell for and a seller 
could ask for whatever price they wanted. Thus, these platforms serve as intermediaries and 
allow for transparency in the transactions.  
To back this position, in 2019 Farfetch launched the “Second Life” initiative, a reselling platform 
that allows for the sale of secondhand handbags. This is part of Farfetch’s sustainable strategy 
and will allow it to capture value from the growing luxury resale market. 
On this platform, people can sell their owned designer bags in exchange for Farfetch credit, a 
way to ensure that all proceedings are put back into the luxury market. This initiative tests for the 
demand of the company’s consumers for this type of service and a way to raise awareness for 
sustainability, while also increasing the company’s revenues. In the future, if Farfetch continues 
investing in this strategy and embracing the resale model, including all types of products, it will 
increase the company value massively, as the secondhand market grows. 
In 2019 the resale luxury market already represented US$24 billion, being forecasted by ThredUp 
to reach US$51 billion in 2024, with a CAGR of 16,27%, fueled mostly by Gen Z’s acceptation of 
resale and the awareness of the need for sustainability, which brings people to shop second-
hand. Assuming that Farfetch sees this opportunity and further develops its resale platform, 
accepting a broader selection of luxury items, and captures only 2% of this market, this would 
mean an increase of revenues of almost US$1,2 billion in 2025. This would be offset by an initial 
investment to further develop the platform and an increase of costs of fulfilment involved with 
getting the products from the owner and to the second-hand buyer, but the upside largely 
surpasses the downside, thus this would be a good investment that promotes sustainability and 
further develops the luxury market, bringing in new costumers and making people who sell their 
products on the platform to use the proceeds to buy on Farfetch. 
The resale market 
presents itself as an 
important opportunity 
that if taken can boost 
the company’s results 
Farfetch launched the 
“Second Life” initiative 
to test for the success 
of this business model. 
 
Multiples Valuation 
According to José Neves, Farfetch’s does not have any direct competitors on the Farfetch 
Marketplace, but the truth is that companies like Net-a-Porter and MyTheresa operate in the same 
format as the marketplace and can act as its competition since consumers can shop on all these 
websites and can choose between them. Furthermore, Farfetch has competition in other areas, 
such as companies that provide platforms for online shopping and luxury sellers, such as brands, 
boutiques, luxury stores, etc. Also, with the addition of the Brand Platform business unit with the 
acquisition of New Guards Group, Farfetch saw new competitors in streetwear brands. 
To perform the multiples valuation the companies considered were Amazon, Ebay and Alibaba 
that can be comparable with Farfetch because of their online presence. We added Netflix, 
Appfolio and Etsy as comparable companies as they are fast growing tech companies, and the 
two latter have similar book values and sales as Farfetch. The multiples used were Price/Sales 
(P/S), Enterprise Value/Sales (EV/S) and Price/Book Value (P/B). Multiples depending on 
EBITDA or Net Income were not applied since Farfetch has never had positive values of EBITDA 
nor Net Income in the past and using these multiples would result in an incorrect valuation of the 
company’s share price. 
Using these multiples within this peer group and the values forecasted by the analysts for Farfetch 
in 2021, we arrive at a share price of US$75,64, US$74,97, and US$25,32 for P/S, EV/S and P/B 
respectively. This gives us a median share price of US$74,97 for Farfetch. This value is a little 
higher than the true share price for Farfetch but it is a possible value for the future price of the 
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Farfetch's Implied Share Price
Comparables  P/S EV/S P/B 
Amazon 4,77x 4,85x 19,89x 
Alibaba 7,58x 6,96x 4,82x 
Ebay 3,28x 3,66x 11,97x 
Appfolio 20,77x 20,30x 22,55x 
Etsy 16,19x 15,89x 33,46x 
Netflix 9,79x 10,20x 22,59x 
25% quartile 5,47x 5,38x 13,95x 
Median 8,69x 8,58x 21,22x 
75% quartile 14,59x 14,47x 22,58x 
Figure 12: Possible revenues with 
Resale (in thousands of $). 
Source: Analysts’ forecast 
Figure 13: Implied share price of Farfetch 
through multiple valuation. 
Source: Bloomberg, Analysts calculations 
Figure 14: Multiples and comparables 
used for multiple valuations 
Source: Bloomberg, Analysts 
calculations 
Scenario Analysis 
To perform the valuation three different scenarios were forecasted and given different 
probabilities according to what we expect is the likelihood of them happening. The base 
scenario, which was calculated based on the most probable assumptions, previously described, 
given the current economic and market landscape arrived at a value of US$64,48, through 
DCF’s and was given a weight of 80%. The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios differ in the 
negotiating power of Farfetch, affecting its Working Capital, the market growth, how well 
Farfetch penetrates the Asia Pacific region and how Farfetch will fare against more direct 
competitors. 
The pessimistic scenario sees worse bargaining power for the company, which worsens the 
Working Capital for Farfetch, where wholesale clients take longer to pay and Farfetch pays 
faster to its suppliers, bringing the cash conversion cycle down. Furthermore, in this scenario, 
the appearance of Amazon’s luxury platform brings active costumers down, while the 
partnership with Alibaba and Richemont that looks to increase Farfetch’s presence in the Asia 
Pacific region does not go according to plan and the increase in active costumers and average 
order value does not grow as expected. In addition, the Brand Platform sees lower revenues, as 
they prove not as effective in discovering and developing good brands that can compete with 
the ones already established, not taking advantage of the luxury trends, and not creating good 
enough value for Farfetch. In the pessimistic scenario, Farfetch’s valuation translates a share 
price of US$32,72.  
The optimistic scenario implies better market conditions, which improve in-store sales, better 
Working Capital conditions due to Farfetch having better negotiating power and Brand Platform 
proving their ability to develop good brands that go in line with the market trends. In this 
scenario, Farfetch penetrates the market more easily, getting more active consumers than 
expected and the partnership between Farfetch and Alibaba proves successful, while Amazon’s 
platform is considered unnecessary, as Neves claims it will be, since there are plenty of players 
that already provide the same service as this new platform will try to offer. The share price that 





To the bear scenario we gave a probability of only 5%, since we believe this scenario is highly 
unlikely, as the biggest part of luxury’s growth comes from Asia and partnering with one of the 
biggest players in this region will most likely bring good results. Furthermore, we expect that 
with the COVID-19 pandemic both suppliers and wholesale clients realised that Farfetch is an 
important and reliable player, which can give it higher bargaining power and we see as more 
likely that the New Guards Group brings new trendy brands, as they have done in the past, 
bringing good results to the parent company. Because of this, we gave the bull scenario a 
probability of 15% which finally gives the scenario analysis a value of US$70,33. 
 
Scenario Share Price  Probability 
Pessimistic $32,72 5% 
Base $64,48 80% 
Optimistic $114,04 15% 
Target Price $70,33  
Figure 15: Different scenarios’ share 
price and probability  
Source: Analysts’ assumptions 
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